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Capital City Bank, by and through its counsel, Watkiss & Campbell, submits this
Brief of the Respondent in accordance with the rules of this Court.
JURISDICTION OF COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
granted by this Court on June 12, 1989. The statutory basis for the grant of certiorari is
stated in Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989).
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted
summary judgment if favor of Capital City Bank, and against Michael Landes and others.
Michael Landes and others appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Utah Supreme
Court.

On July 23, 1987, this Court poured-over the appeal to the Utah Court of

Appeals. On January 12, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989).
A Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on January 31, 1989.
On March 2, 1989, Michael Landes filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals, which was granted by this Court on June 12, 1989.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statement of Issues Presented
1.

Whether this appeal was rendered moot by the assignment of the interest of

the Small Business Administration in the absolute unconditional guaranty of Michael
Landes to Capital City Bank.

1

2.

Whether the Utah Court of Appeals and the Third Judicial District Court

abused their discretion in failing to require the joinder of the SBA in this action, pursuant
to Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The applicable standard of appellate review of failure to join a party under Rule
19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is whether the lower courts abused their discretion.
Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assoc, Inc., 728
P.2d 1017 (1986).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. executed a note in favor of Capital City Bank, and
in which note the Small Business Administration (SBA), an agency of the United States
of America, was participating.

Michael Landes executed an absolute unconditional

guaranty, in favor of Capital City Bank and SBA, of the note of Bagel Nosh
Intermountain, Ltd. payable to Capital City Bank. Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. filed
a petition for relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code. Bagel Nosh Intermountain,
Ltd. and Michael Landes defaulted in their obligations under the note and guaranty to
Capital City Bank.

Course of the Proceedings
Michael Landes commenced an action in the Third Judicial District Court against
Capital City Bank seeking to be discharged of his obligations under the absolute
unconditional guaranty executed by him in favor of Capital City Bank and SBA. Capital
City Bank answered the complaint and counterclaimed against Michael Landes for
enforcement of the absolute unconditional guaranty for judgment to collect all sums due
and owing under the note in favor of Capital City Bank. After discovery was conducted
by Michael Landes, Capital City Bank moved for summary judgment to dismiss all claims
of Michael Landes against Capital City Bank and for judgment on the absolute
unconditional guaranty of Michael Landes for all sums due and owing under the note. In
response to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Capital City Bank, Michael
Landes argued that joinder of the SBA was required.
Disposition in Court Below
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding,
granted summary judgment in favor of Capital City Bank, stating that joinder of the SBA
was not required. Michael Landes appealed the decision of the Third Judicial District
Court. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Third Judicial District
Court, opining that although the District Court failed to state findings demonstrating that
it had applied the proper analysis for determining the appropriateness of joinder under
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the error was harmless because joinder of the
SBA was not required.
3

Statement of the Facts
1.

On December 24, 1979, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. (Inc.), a New York

Corporation, executed a note solely in favor of Capital City Bank in the principal sum of
$300,000.00 (hereinafter "Note"). Complaint, paragraph 5, ROA at 3; Complaint, Exhibit
A, ROA at 13; Answer, paragraph 5, ROA at 25; Counterclaim, paragraph 2, ROA at 28;
Counterclaim, Exhibit 1, ROA 35; Answer to Counterclaim, paragraph 2, ROA at 67;
Memorandum Decision of Third Judicial District Court, ROA at 310.
2.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) is a participant in the Note. Note,

ROA at 106; Affidavit of M.A. Allem, paragraph 11, ROA at 187.
3.

The Note is governed by applicable federal law. Note, ROA at 106.

4.

On December 24, 1979, Michael Landes, Appellant herein, executed an

absolute, unconditional and personal guaranty, of the Note, in favor of SBA and Capital
City Bank (hereinafter "Guaranty").

Complaint; paragraph 7, ROA at 4; Complaint

Exhibit 13, ROA at 20; Answer, paragraph 7, ROA at 25; Counterclaim, paragraph 7,
ROA at 29; Counterclaim, Exhibit 3, ROA at 40; Answer to Counterclaim, paragraph 7,
ROA at 68; Memorandum Decision of Third Judicial District Court, ROA at 310; Partial
Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, paragraph 1, ROA at 396.
5.

On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. filed a voluntary

petition for relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code. Complaint, paragraph 11,
ROA at 5; and Answer and Counterclaim, paragraph 11, ROA at 25.
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6.

Landes, as a guarantor, made payments to Capital City Bank on the Note,

between November 29, 1984 and December 27, 1985, during the pendency of the
bankruptcy proceeding of Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. Complaint, paragraph 14, ROA
at 5; Answer and Counterclaim, paragraph 14, ROA at 25; and Affidavit of M.A. Allem,
paragraph 15, ROA at 187.
7.

The obligations of Michael Landes, under his Guaranty, have been in default

since at least January 25, 1986. Affidavit of M.A. Allem, paragraph 16, ROA at 187.
8.

The last payment on the Note to Capital City Bank was December 27, 1985.

Affidavit of M.A. Allem, paragraph 17, ROA at 188.
9.

On March 11, 1986, Michael Landes, Appellant herein, and others,

commenced an action, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, against Capital City Bank, Respondent herein, requesting, inter alia, that the Court
declare the Guaranty to be void and of no effect and discharging Michael Landes from
any obligation to Capital City Bank under the Guaranty. Complaint, ROA at 2-21.
10.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) was not named as a defendant by

Michael Landes in the Complaint. Complaint, ROA at 2-21.
11.

Capital City Bank is the legal holder of the Note and Guaranty and was

authorized by the SBA in writing to sue upon the Note and Guaranty and accelerate the
maturities thereof. Supplemental Affidavit of M.A. Allem, paragraphs 5 and 6, ROA at
251-252.
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12.

On April 1, 1986, Capital City Bank filed an Answer and Counterclaim to

the Complaint requesting, inter alia, judgment against Michael Landes for the balance due
and owing under the Note, in accordance with the terms of the Guaranty. Answer and
Counterclaim, ROA at 24-45.
13.

On April 24, 1986, Michael Landes served Plaintiffs First Set of Request

[sic] for Admissions and Interrogatories on Capital City Bank. Certificate of Service, ROA
at 65.
14.

On May 27, 1986, Capital City Bank timely served its responses to Plaintiffs

First Set of Request [sic] for Admissions and Interrogatories. Certificate of Service, ROA
at 73-74.
15.

On July 25, 1986, Capital City Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

to resolve all issues in the Complaint and the Counterclaim.

Motion for Summary

Judgment, ROA at 100-102.
16.

On October 27, 1986, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Capital

City Bank was heard before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson and the matter taken
under advisement. Minute Entry, ROA at 307.
17.

On February 4, 1987, after legal research and a careful review of the

evidence, the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered
a Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment in favor of Capital City Bank on all
causes of action and against Michael Landes, and others, on all causes of action.
Memorandum Decision, ROA at 308-314.
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18.

On May 20, 1987, the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, executed a Partial Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure in favor of
Capital City Bank on all causes of action, and against Michael Landes, and others, on all
causes of action. Partial Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, ROA at 395-401.
19.

On January 12, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion affirming

the Partial Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure of the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App.
1989); ROA at 517-522.
20.

On June 12, 1989, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah granted the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Michael Landes. ROA at 524.
21.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Michael Landes presents three

issues for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, as follows:
1.

"Did the Appellate Court err in failing to enforce the mandatory
joinder of a necessary party required by Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure."

2.

"Did the Appellate Court err in deciding that as a matter of law a
[sic] obligee who authorizes a co-obligee to enforce their joint claim
is not an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure."
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3.

"Did the Appellate Court err in concluding that the District Court's
failure to properly analyze the issue of joinder under Rule 19, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, was harmless error."

Petition for Certiorari, p.l; ROA at 529.
22.

On October 6, 1988, the Small Business Administration (SBA), by and

through its authorized official, assigned all of its right, title, and interest, if any, in the
Guaranty to Capital City Bank.

Affidavit of Stan Nakano, attached to Respondent's

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Appeal
of Michael Landes (Suggestion of Mootness) as Exhibit A and Affidavit of M.A. Allem,
attached to Respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion
to Dismiss the Appeal of Michael Landes (Suggestion of Mootness) as Exhibit B.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point 1
All issues of this appeal relate to whether the SBA should have been joined in this
action in accordance with Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, The issues of joinder
are predicated upon the fact that the SBA is a named beneficiary of the Guaranty
executed by Michael Landes. At the request of Capital City Bank, the SBA transferred
to Capital City Bank all of the legal right, title, and interest of SBA in the Guaranty of
Michael Landes, thereby resolving the issues of whether the SBA should be joined in this
action.

Because the SBA is no longer named in the Guaranty executed by Michael

Landes, the requested relief of joinder of the SBA is meaningless, ergo, moot.
8

Point 2
Neither the District Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals abused their discretion
by refusing to join the SBA in this action. An abuse of discretion occurs when the lower
court acts in a manner so clearly outside of reason that is capricious and arbitrary. Action
is arbitrary or capricious when no reasonable person would espouse the decision of the
court. Although the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that the District Court failed to
enter findings to support its conclusion that joinder of SBA was not required. However,
the Utah Court of Appeals found the error to be harmless because it concurred with the
District Court that the SBA need not be joined in this case. Because the decisions of the
District Court and the Utah Court of Appeals were not arbitrary or capricious and
reasonable persons concur in those decisions, neither court abused its discretion in
concluding that joinder of SBA was not necessary.
Point 3
The first step in an analysis of joinder under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, is to determine if the party proposed to be joined is necessary. Michael Landes
assumes, and never argues, either facts or law to support his position that the SBA is
necessary to this action. A careful reading of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
discloses that the decision of that Court was that the SBA was not a necessary party,
because that Court used the terms "necessary" and "indispensable" interchangeably. To be
necessary, the absent party must have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case. The

9

SBA does not have a legal interest in the outcome of this case and, therefore, is not
necessary.
Point 4
A court must find that a party is necessary to an action prior to determining
indispensability. If a party is not necessary to an action, then the absent party is not
indispensable. Because the SBA is not a necessary party to this action, it can not be an
indispensable party to this action.

Point 5
Michael Landes hypothesizes and speculates that the SBA has a claim against him
based upon the Guaranty executed by him. The only claim fathomable is a claim of the
SBA to require Michael Landes, under the Guaranty, to pay Capital City Bank the balance
due and owing under the Note. Only Capital City Bank is entitled to collect funds under
the Note.
instruments.

The general law of real party in interest does not apply to negotiable
The legal holder of a negotiable instrument is entitled to collect the

instrument notwithstanding actual ownership of the instrument. Accordingly, the SBA may
assert no claim against Michael Landes, through enforcement of the Guaranty, to collect
the Note.

10

ARGUMENT
Point 1
The Issues of This Appeal are Moot Because of the
Assignment from SBA to Capital City Bank.
The three issues, upon which this Court granted certiorari, each focus on whether
the SBA should have been joined as a party to this action because the absolute
unconditional Guaranty is issued in favor of both Capital City Bank and the SBA. The
interest of the SBA in the absolute unconditional Guaranty was assigned to Capital City
Bank in an effort to resolve the issue of joinder, terminate this litigation and eliminate the
suggestion of double liability as hypothesized by Michael Landes.
As stated by this Court:
An appeal is moot if during the pendency of the appeal circumstances
change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief
requested impossible or of no legal effect. Franklin Financial v. New Empire
Development, 659 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1983).
If this Court were to determine that the SBA should have been joined in this proceeding,
then joinder would be superfluous because of the assignment of the interest of SBA in the
absolute unconditional Guaranty to Capital City Bank. Joinder of the SBA at this time
would be of no legal effect upon these proceedings, which satisfies the standard of
mootness articulated by this Court:
If the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the
case is moot and a court will normally refrain from hearing it on the merits.
Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981).
Michael Landes argues, in his memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss
for mootness, that the assignment does not resolve the issues before this Court because

11

Michael Landes is entitled to assert claims against SBA. However, the District Court has
finally adjudicated, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, that Michael Landes has no
defenses under the absolute unconditional Guaranty. Therefore, remand for joinder of
SBA would not affect the rights of the litigants.
Furthermore, the Guaranty provides that Michael Landes will pay the obligations
of Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. to Capital City Bank under the Note. The only relief
that the SBA could request is for Michael Landes to pay the obligations of Bagel Nosh
Intermountain, Ltd. under the Note to Capital City Bank as if Michael Landes were the
direct obligor thereunder. The Guaranty does not provide either Capital City Bank or
SBA the right to collect the sums due and owing under the Note, but solely the right to
require Michael Landes, as the guarantor, to pay all sums due and owing under the Note
as if he were the direct obligor thereunder. Accordingly, any claim that Michael Landes
may have against the SBA would not be subject to offset in this proceeding. No purpose,
either legally or equitably, is served by the joinder of the SBA due to the assignment of
the interest of SBA in the Guaranty from SBA to Capital City Bank. Thus, this appeal
is moot.
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Point 2
Neither the District Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals
Abused Their Discretion in Failing to Require
the Joinder of the SBA in This Action.
This Court must determine whether the lower courts abused their discretion in
failing to require the joinder of the SBA in this proceeding. Bonneville Tower v. Thompson
Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). This Court has stated that:
[The Supreme Court] will not interfere with matters of discretion or upset
the actions of the lower tribunal except upon a showing that the tribunal
acted in excess of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside of reason
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. Peatross v. Board
of Com'rs of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976).
The District Court and the Utah Court of Appeals possessed the authority to refuse
to join the SBA as a party to this action. Michael Landes has not disputed the authority
of the lower courts, but has argued that the decision reached by those courts was
erroneous. It seems difficult to extend the argument of Michael Landes to state that the
District Court acted "in a manner so clearly outside of reason that its action must be
deemed capricious and arbitrary11 when a panel of the Utah Court of Appeals has reached
the same conclusion.
Other courts have further elaborated the definition of an abuse of discretion. For
example, the Supreme Court of Kansas has ruled:
Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or
unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only
where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court.
If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the
trial court then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.
Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Sec. of Kan. Dept. of Transp., 671 P.2d 511 (Kan.
1983)(citations omitted).
13

Although the Utah Court of Appeals disagreed with the approach used by the District
Court to analyze the joinder issue, each court concluded that the SBA need not be joined
in this action. Accordingly, the District Court and the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals
did not abuse their discretion in denying the request for joinder of the SBA.
Point 3
The SBA is Not a Necessary Party, Under Rule 19(a).
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that the first analysis under Rule 19, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, is to determine "whether an absent party has sufficient interest in the
action to make it a necessary party." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah
App. 1989)(citation omitted). Michael Landes agrees with the first step of the analysis
outlined by the Utah Court of Appeals. Brief of Appellant, p. 13. Michael Landes
concludes that because the Utah Court of Appeals stated that the SBA was not an
indispensable party, "the Appellate Court implicitly recognized SBA's status as a necessary
party under Rule 19(a)." Brief of Appellant, p. 14. Based upon the interpretation of
Michael Landes, implicitly assuming that SBA is a necessary party, Michael Landes leap
frogs the issue of whether the SBA is a necessary party, which he acknowledges is the
threshold step of the analysis. Michael Landes does not advance any argument, either
legal or factual, that the SBA is a necessary party or discuss the issue.
A careful reading of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals reveals that the
terms "necessary" and "indispensable" were used interchangeably in the opinion.

For

example, the section of the opinion addressing this issue is entitled "RULE 19
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INDISPENSABLE PARTIES." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah App.
1989). The factual analysis applied by the Utah Court of Appeals, after stating the
appropriate legal analysis, focuses on whether the SBA had a sufficient interest in the
action to make it a necessary party. The Utah Court of Appeals applied the undisputed
facts in the record to the individual criteria outlined in Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In particular, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed whether Michael Landes
would be subjected to multiple liability and whether the SBA could assert a claim against
Michael Landes. The Utah Court of Appeals did not address the factors set forth in
subsection (b) of the rule relative to whether a party is indispensable.
A careful review of the analysis of the Utah Court of Appeals leads logically to the
conclusion that the Utah Court of Appeals used the terms "necessary" and "indispensable"
interchangeably and intended to state that the SBA was not a necessary party when it
stated that the SBA was not an indispensable party. Because all obligations of the Note
run in favor of Capital City Bank, the SBA does not have a sufficient legal interest to be
a necessary party. Accordingly, the SBA is not a necessary party to this action.
Point 4
The SBA is Not an Indispensable Party to This Action.
The argument of Michael Landes, that the SBA must be joined because it is subject
to service of process, is predicated upon the implicit assumption that the SBA is a
necessary party. The analysis of whether a party is indispensable is dependent upon a
finding that the party is necessary. See, Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Michael Landes relies upon the decisions in Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (1984)
and Intermountain Phy. Med. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah App. 1987) to
support his position that the SBA should have been joined as an indispensable party.
However, in each of those cases, the absent party was determined to be necessary,
Michael Landes also states that the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is "in
direct contradiction to this Court's decision in Hiltsley." Brief of Appellant, p. 12. In
Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987), this Court reversed a judgment in favor of
a nonparty to the action for lack of jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to join that
party as a necessary party to the action. It is unclear why the decision of the Utah Court
of Appeals in this case is in conflict with that decision, because in that case this Court
determined that the absent party was necessary. Because the SBA is not a necessary party
to this action, it can not be an indispensable party.

Point 5
SBA Cannot Assert Claims Under the Note
Against Michael Landes.
It is undisputed that the SBA is a participating lender with Capital City Bank in the
Note. The last paragraph of the Note clearly states that the SBA is or will participate in
the loan and therefore provides for its enforcement in accordance with applicable federal
law. Note, ROA at 106. See also, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
87 L.Ed.2d 838 (1943) (Federal law governs issues relative to the federal program of the
SBA). The record clearly states that the SBA is a participant in the Note to the extent
of ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding unpaid balance of the Note. Affidavit of M.A.
16

Mem, ROA at 187. Under applicable federal law, the SBA, as a participant in the Note,
can look solely to Capital City Bank, the lead lender, for satisfaction of its claims because
the SBA is not itself a creditor of Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., the obligor under the
Note, and cannot assert creditor claims against Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., the
borrower. Hibernia Nat Bank v. F.D.I.C, 733 F.2d 1403, 1407 (10th Cir. 1984).
The general rule of real party in interest, as outlined by Rule 17, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, does not apply in the context of negotiable instruments. Utah Code Ann.
§70A-3-301 (1980). Section 3-301 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides:
The holder of an instrument whether of not he is the owner may transfer or
negotiate it and, except as otherwise provided in section 70A-3-603 on
payment or satisfaction, discharge it or enforce payment in his own name.
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-301 (1980).
Accordingly, Capital City Bank, as the holder and sole payee under the Note is entitled
to enforce payment and discharge the Note in its own name, regardless of whether or not
Capital City Bank is the owner of the Note.
Although federal law governs, in the absence of a federal rule, state law may be
adopted as the proper federal rule under appropriate guidelines. United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-740, 59 L.Ed.2d 711, 723-732 (1979); and United States v.
New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 845 (10th Cir. 1986). In the absence of a
federal rule, section 3-301 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code may be applied in this
context because it is a uniform law which has been adopted in each of the fifty states of
the United States, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
Virgin Islands without variation or modification. Accord, United States v. Lattauzio, 748
17

F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1984). See, [State Correlation Tables] U.C.C.Rep.Serv. (Callaghan)
(1989).
Accordingly, Capital City Bank, as the holder of the Note, is the only party entitled
to enforce and discharge the Note.

Although the SBA may have an ownership or

equitable interest in the Note, it does not have a legal interest as a holder which is
required in order to collect upon the Note. The SBA is not entitled to collect funds or
assert claims under the Note.

Therefore, the SBA may not assert claims, through

enforcement of the Guaranty, against Michael Landes for collection of the Note.
CONCLUSION
All issues of this appeal relate to the joinder of the SBA as an indispensable party
because the SBA was a named beneficiary under the Guaranty executed by Michael
Landes. The SBA has assigned all legal right, title, and interest in the Guaranty of
Michael Landes to Capital City Bank. Therefore, all issues of this appeal have been
rendered moot.
The standard of review to be applied by this Court, of a decision denying joinder
of an absent party under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is whether the lower
courts abused their discretion. If reasonable persons concur in the decisions reached by
the lower courts, that joinder of the SBA is not necessary, then the lower courts did not
abuse their discretion. Because the decisions of the lower courts were not arbitrary or
capricious, those courts did not abuse their discretion.
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Joinder of an absent party is not required unless the absent party is necessary to
an action.

To be necessary, the absent party must have a sufficient interest in the

outcome of the case. The SBA does not have a legal interest in the outcome of this case,
and, therefore, is not necessary to this case.
An indispensable party, at a minimum, is a necessary party to the case. Because
the SBA is not necessary to this case, it is not an indispensable party.
Only Capital City Bank is entitled to collect funds under the Note. The Guaranty
of Michael Landes assures payment of the Note. The general law of real party in interest
does not apply to negotiable instruments. Capital City Bank as the legal holder of the
Note is entitled to collect the Note notwithstanding actual ownership thereof. Accordingly,
the SBA has no claim against Michael Landes.
Capital City Bank respectfully requests this Court to dismiss this appeal as moot,
or, in the alternative, to affirm the decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting the Partial Final
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure dated May 20, 1987, in favor of Capital City Bank
and against Michael Landes.
DATED this /O

day of October, 1989.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

Steven T. Waterman
Attorneys for Capital City Bank
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Seftel i Capital i IM Hunk ' ^ P M 'Ml 11 Uah App. 1989)
Se/te/ w. Capital City Bank, Civil No. C-86-1810, Memorandum Decision,
(February 4, l%7)

Tinson

Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or,
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be
dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim tor
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-<2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons
why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of
Rule 23.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
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Sidney SEFTEL, Theresa Seftel, and
Michael Landes, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation, Defendant and
Respondent
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation, Counterclaimant,
•.

Sidney SEFTEL, Theresa Seftel, Michael
Landes, Utah State Tax Commission,
Crossroads Plaza Associates, a Utah
joint venture and general partnership,
Young Electric Sign Company, a Utah
corporation, and Olympus Hills Shopping Center, LTD., a Utah limited partnership, Counterclaim Defendants.
No. 870312-CA.
Court ot Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 12, 1989.
Rehearing Denied January 31,1989.
Guarantors under note brought declaratory action against payee seeking order
discharging them from obligations under
the guaranties. Creditor counterclaimed to
enforce guaranties. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., granted summary judgment in favor of payee. Guarantors appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that (1)
colender was not an indispensable party to
contract or tort designation of the cause of
action rather academic Cf. Back v. Farmers'
Ins. Exck, 701 P.2d 795, SO 1-02 (Utah 19S5)
(comparing range of damages available in tort
and contract).
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the case, where there was uncontroverted
evidence that colender had authorized lender to sue on note and related guaranties,
and (2) guarantors waived right, under
guaranty agreement, to raise defense of
impairment of collateral.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error *»187(3)
Parties *»8<X1), 84(1)
Party to a lawsuit may raise the issue
of failure to join an indispensable party at
any time in the proceedings, including for
the first time on appeal. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 19(a).
2. Appeal and Error *»1036(3)
Trial court's failure to follow two-step
analysis, required under procedural rule to
determine if colender in a suit to enforce
note guaranties was an indispensable party, was harmless error, where there was
clear evidence supporting court's ultimate
conclusion that colender was not indispensable party. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 19.
3. Contracts *»330(1)
• a general contract rule, joint obligees are deemed indispensable parties in a
suit against obligor.
4. Guaranty *»82(2)
Colender under note was not indispensable party in action brought to enforce
guaranties of note, where uncontroverted
affidavit evidence from lender indicated colender authorized suit on note and related
guaranties and acceleration of their matur
ties
& Goaranty *•*>
Ordinarily, when a creditor, by his actions, impairs the value of collateral securing the underlying obligation, either absolute or conditional, guaranteed by guarantor, guarantor will be discharged from his
obligation to extent of impairment
6. Guaranty *»72
Guarantors under loan agreement
waived rights to assert defenses of impairment of collateral or modification of underlying obligation, under terms of guaranty
agreement, which provided for guarantors'

consent to release or discharge of collateral
and provided guarantors no recourse in the
event of such actions.
7, Guaranty **72
Fhere was no evidence, in action to
enforce guaranties of note, that lender's
actions were "willful," so as to preclude
waiver of impairment of collateral defense
under guaranties relating to a Small Business Administration financed loan.
Daniel W. Jackson (argued), Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
David M. Connors (argued), LeBoeuf,
Lamb, Leiby & McRae, Salt Lake City, for
Landes
Steven T. Waterman (argued), Herschei
J. Saperstein, Marco B. Kunz, Watkiss &
Campbell, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and respondent
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and
ORMEf JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Plaintiffs/appellants, Sidney Seftel,
Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes,
("guarantors") appeal from the trial court's
summary judgment dismissing their complaint and granting defendant/respondent,
Capital City Bank, ("Capital") judgment in
the amount of $293,319.64 and issuing a
decree of foreclosure. Guarantors seek a
reversal of the trial court's order. We
affirm.
PACTS
On December 24,1979, Bagel Nosh intermountain, Ltd., ("Bagel Nosh") executed a
note in favor of Capital in the principal
amount of $800,000. Under the terms of
the note, the Small Business Administration ("SBA") was a 90% participating lender. The note also provides it is to be enforced in "accordance with applicable fed*
eral law."
As additional consideration for the loan,
guarantors each executed unconditional
personal guaranties. The guaranties were
secured by trust deeds to real property
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by guarantors and located at Snowbird A * P * * " ^ 6 8 w*re executed on
SBA IOTTM in favor of both the SBA and
Capital as "co-lenders." Specifically, the
guaranties state:
In order to induce Capital City Bank and
SBA (hereinafter called "Lender'') to
make a loan ... to Bagel Nosh Intermountain, LTD. (Inc.) ... (hereinafter
called the "Debtor"), the Undersigned
hereby unconditionally guarantees to
Lender, ... the due and punctual payment when due, ... of the principal of
and interest on and all sums payable ...
vrith respect to the note of the Debtor. . • •
The Undersigned waives any notice of
the incurring by the Debtor at any
time of any of the Liabilities, and
waives any and all presentment, demand, protest or notice of dishonor,
nonpayment, or other default with respect to any of the Liabilities — The
Undersigned hereby grants to Lender
full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice to the undersigned ..., to deal in any manner with
the Liabilities and the collateral, including, ... the following powers:
(a) To modify or otherwise change any
terms of all or any part of the Liabilities ... to grant any extension or renewal thereof ... and to effect any
release, compromise or settlement with
respect thereto;
(d) To consent to the substitution, exchange, or release of all or any part of
the collateral....
The obligations of the Undersigned
hereunder shall not be released, discharged, or in any way affected, nor
shall the Undersigned have any rights
or recourse against Lender, by reason
of any action Lender may take or omit
to take under the foregoing powers.
On March 30, 1988, following several
months of nonpayment, Bagel Nosh and
Capital entered into a Loan Restructure
Agreement ("Agreement") modifying the
terms of the original note. The Agreement

was signed by Sidney Seftel and provided
in relevant partCapital ... agrees to modify the terms
of the loan agreement dated December
24, 1979, between [Capital] and [Bagel
Nosh] under the following conditions:
5. Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes
personally guarantee [Capital's] loan
to the Borrower. Each is personally
liable for the entire indebtedness to
[Capital]....
6. Any item in the loan agreement dated December 24, 1979, that is not specifically modified by this loan restructure agreement remains in full force.
Guarantors complied with the terms of
the Agreement and made several payments
thereunder.
On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed
a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. On March 11, 1986,
guarantors filed this action for declaratory
relief requesting the trial court to discharge them from any obligations under
their personal guaranties on the grounds
that Capital, (1) willfully impaired the collateral originally pledged to secure the
note, (2) recklessly lost their security, and
(3) substantially modified guarantors' obligations underlying the guaranties by the
Loan Restructure Agreement
Capital counterclaimed requesting the
trial court to declare the guaranties and
corresponding trust deeds valid enforceable
obligations. Capital further requested a
judicial decree of foreclosure on the trust
deeds.
On July 25, 1986, Capital filed a motion
for summary judgment on the issues in
guarantors' complaint and Capital's counterclaim. Capital claimed the note, Agreement, and guaranties were all in default
Capital argued the guaranties were enforceable, thus, they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, (1) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-301 (1978),
as holder of the guaranties, Capital was
entitled to enforce them, (2) guarantors by
prior judicial admissions were estopped
from denying liability, and (3) under the
express provisions of the guaranties, guar-
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antors waived the detVns^i ^A furth in
their complaint
In support of its motion for summary
judgment, Capital submitted, among a
number of documents, the affidavit of M.A.
Allem, Capital's executive vice president
In his affidavit, Mr. Allem states in pertinent part that the "SBA is a participating
lender in the loan of Capital City to Bagel
Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%)
of the outstanding unpaid balance."
On September 5, 1986, Capital filed the
supplemental affidavit of Mr Allem which
stated:
5. Capital City is entitled to sue upon
the loan instruments including acceleration of the maturity of the note and
guaranties provided Capital City has
obtained the written consent of SBA.
6. Capital City is the legal holder of the
note and guaranties involved in this
action, and Capital City has not transferred the note or guaranties to SBA
and has been authorized in writing by
SBA to sue upon the note and guaranties
On September 11, 1986, guarantors filed
their memorandum in opposition to Capital's motion for summary judgment claiming for the first time that the SBA was an
indispensable party, and thus must be
joined in order for Capital to enforce the
guaranties.
On February 4, 1987, the trial court issued its memorandum decision granting
summary judgment in favor of Capital on
all issues in the complaint and counterclaim. Guarantors appeal this order.
!

find the trial court did not properly analyze
the issue of whether the SBA is an indig.
pensable party, we affirm the trial court's
decision as we find based upon the undUputed facts in the record, the SBA is not
as a matter of law, an indispensable party.
Required Analysis Under Rule 19
In its February 4th memorandum decision the trial court stated:
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an
indispensable party, the Small Business
Administration, has not been joined.
That defense is without merit In the
first instance, the defense has not been
pled, but additionally, the SBA is not
under the present interpretation of the
Rules of Procedure an indispensable party to this action.
[1] Guarantors claim the trial court
committed reversible error by permitting
Capital to enforce the guaranties without
making particularized findings pursuant to
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.1 While actual findings of fact were
not strictly required as this matter was
presented on a motion for summary judgment, the guarantors' basic contention is
well-taken. We note that Rule 19 of the
Utah Rules is substantively similar to its
federal counterpart, see Utah R.Civ.P. 19
compiler's notes, and in the absence of
Utah authority, we resort to the more
abundant federal case law for guidance.
We also note that a party may raise the
issue of failure to join an indispensable
party at any time in the proceedings, including for the first time on appeal. See,
e.g„ Kroblin Refrigerated Xpreee, Inc. v.
Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 104 (3rd Cir.1986).
Accordingly, this issue is properly before
us.

RULE 19—INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
Ordinarily, a trial court's
In its memorandum decision, the trial
court found that Capital was entitled to properly entered under Rule
enforce the guaranties and the SBA was disturbed absent an abuse
not an indispensable party. Although we See, e.g., Bonneville Tower
1. The portion of Utah RXiv.P. 19 upon which
guarantors rely provides:
A person ... shall be joined as a party
the action if ... (2) he claims an interest in
the subject matter and is so situated that his
absence may ... (ii) leave any of the persons

determination
19 will not be
of discretion.
v. Thompson

already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest
Utah R.CW.P. 19(a).
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Vicki* Assoc*., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah
1986); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New

action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

See

Utah R.Civ.P. 19(b). See also Wright v.
Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1471 (10th Cir.1987); First Nat'l Bank of Altus, Oklahoma,
Walsh v. Centeio, 692 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th 483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir.1973). In light of
Cir.l982). Whether a party is indispens- these factors, the ultimate test under Rule
able to the action depend on a number 19(b) is "whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed." Many0f factors all "varying wr.a the different
cases, some such factors being substantive, goats, 558 F.2d at 558.
some procedural, some compelling by themFurthermore, abstract generalizations
selves, and some subject to balancing
are
not a substitute for the analysis reagainst opposing interests." Provident
quired
under Rule 19. Provident, 390 U.S.
Tradesmen* B. & T. Co. v. Patterson, 390
at
124,
88 S.Ct. at 745.
U.S. 102, 119, 88 S.Ct 733, 743, 19 L.Ed.2d
936 (1968).*
The trial court in this action did not
[2] Federal authorities addressing the follow the analytical steps required by Rule
analytical requirements of Rule 19 uni- 19. The court failed to address the twoformly require a court to follow a two-part step analysis set forth above to demoninquiry. See, e.g., Ogalalla Land Ltd. v. strate that the undisputed facts support its
Wexpro Co., 587 F.Supp. 453, 454 (D.Wyo. ultimate conclusion. Instead, the trial
2984) (citing Wright v. First Natl Bank, court merely stated that "the SBA is not
483 F.2d 73 (10th Cir.1973)). Pursuant to under the present interpretation of the
subsection (a), "a court must first deter- Rules of Procedure an indispensable party
mine whether an absent party has suffi- to this action." Such conclusory statecient interest in the action to make it a ments do not comply with the rule. See,
necessary party/' considering the criteria e.g., Provident, 390 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct at
set forth in the Rule.3 Manygoats v. 745; Wright, 483 F.2d at 75. As the Court
Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir.1977). declared in Wright, "[t]hese conclusionary
If, after the appropriate analysis, a party is statements are of no value because the
deemed ''necessary/' a court must then court finds no facts to support them." 483
proceed to subsection (b), and determine F.2d at 75. (the trial court in Wright
whether the party is indispensable, considstated "complete relief cannot be afforded
ering four factors: (1) to what extent a
the remaining parties for all the reasons
judgment rendered in the person's absence
set out in Rule 19").
will prejudice him or her or those already
parties; (2) the likelihood of reducing or
However, a trial court's failure to follow
avoiding prejudice by protective measures the two-step inquiry under Rule 19 is harmor provisions in the judgment; (3) the ade- less error, if, upon a review of the record,
quacy of the judgment which might be there is clear evidence to support the trial
entered in the person's absence; and (4) the court's ultimate conclusion. See Acton v.
adequacy of UM plaintiffs remedy if the Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1987).
1 Pmviisnt is the landmark case interpreting
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and it has been cited with approval in a number
of Utah decisions. See, «.*, Hiltsky v. Ryder,
73$ P.2d 1024, 102S n. 3 (Utah 1987); Stat* v.
Toledo, 699 P.2d 710, 711 n. 4 (Utah 1985);
Sanpete County Water Conservancy Dist v. Price
River Water Users Assoc, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 n.
5 (Utah 1982).
3. Utah RXiv.P. 19(a) identifies the criteria a
court must consider when determining whether
a party is necessary and provides:
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person
who is subject to service of process and whose

joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of action shall be joined
as a party in the action if (1) in his absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest
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[3,4J As a general contract rule, joint
obligees are deemed indispensable parties
in a suit against an obligor. See, e.g.,
Brackin Tie, Lumber & Chip Co. v.
McLarty Farms, Inc, 704 P.2d 585, 586
(11th Cir.1983) (a review of the case law
reveals that the majority of courts hold
joint Migees are indispensable); Harrell
and Sumner Contracting Co. v. Peabody
Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir.
1977); Bry-Man's, Inc. v. Stute, 312 F.2d
585, 587 (5th Cir.1963); Purcel v. Wells,
236 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir.1956); Fremon
v. W.A. Shea/fer Pen Co., 209 F.2d 627,
633-34 (8th Cir. 1954); Hanna Mining Co.
v. Minnesota Power and Light Co., 573
F.Supp. 1395, 1399 (D.Minn. 1983). See also
C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 1613 at 185-86
(2d ed.1986). Joint obligees are ordinarily
considered indispensable because "[ojbligors have a 'right to stand upon their contract and insist that they shall not be harassed with different actions or suits to
recover parts of one single demand/"
Bry-Mans, 312 F.2d at 587 (citation omitted), (quoting McAulay v. Moody, 185 F.
144 (CC.0re.1911)).
Capital contends that the undisputed
facts in the record demonstrate there is no
possibility of multiple lawsuits because the
SBA has no legal interest in and, therefore,
cannot enforce the guaranties. Capital argues on appeal that the SBA is not a party
to the underlying note and has not funded
any portion of the loan to Bagel Nosh.
Furthermore, Capital claims that the SBA
has given Capital written authorization to
sue on the guaranties. Therefore, Capital
claims the SBA is not, as a matter of law,
an indispensable party. To support its allegations Capital directs our attention to the
affidavit of MJL Allem which states that
"Capital City is the legal holder of the note
and guaranties involved in this action and
has been authorized in writing by the SBA
to sue upon the note and guaranties and
accelerate the maturity thereof."
No objection was made below to this
affidavit and no counter affidavit was filed,
thus we accept the factual allegations as
true on appeal. See Trimble Real Estate
v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 456

(Utah Ct.App.1988); Salt Lake City c0Tp
v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P.2d 49
46 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Accordingly, Mr
Allem's affidavit establishes that the SBA
has given Capital written authorization to
sue upon the note and the guaranties, and
thus, based on the undisputed facts before
us is not an indispensable party.
We do not, however, suggest that absent
such authorization by the SBA, the SBA
would necessarily be an indispensable p ^
ty. Although the guaranties expressly run
to both Capital and the SBA, suggesting it
first blush that both would be indispensable to any action seeking enforcement of
the guaranties, the only obligation guana,
tied is the $800,000 note, which is payaMs
by Bagel Noeh solely to Capital So long
as Capital is the holder of the note, as a
matter of ordinary commercial law there m
no obligation due under the note from Bagel Nosh to the SBA and, seemingly, asunderlying obligation oi Bagel Noah wMcfc
the guarantors can be said to have guanatied to the SBA. However, federal law and
extensive federal regulation govern these
transactions which might conceivably require a different analysis but one we need
not reach in this case to find that the SBA
is not an indispensable party as a matter of
law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's determination.
TT

SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING
GUARANTORS' COMPLAINT
To determine whether summary judgment was properly entered, we employ the
same analytical standard aa that of the
trial court Because summary judgment
deprives a party of its opportunity to
present its case on the merits, we review
the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the
judgment was granted Atlas Corp. a
Claris Natl Bank, 787 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah
1987). If, after a review of the record, we
conclude that a genuine issue of material
fact exists, we must reverse the summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings on that issue. Id.

SEFTEL v. CAPITAL CITY BANK

Utah

947

CJ!«»7»7 ?Jd 941 (Uuh App. 19t9)

pjfat a careful review of the record in
his cM*» w e conclude the guarantors have
toted *° ra * se ^ e n u ^ e i s s u e s °f material
fact and, as a matter of law, their defenses
s t fail. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
part's order dismissing guarantors' complaint.
Impairment of Collateral
[5-7] We first address whether guarantors waived their right to assert the defense of "impairment of collateral." Based
on the express terms of the original guaranties dated December 24, 1979, we conclude guarantors waived this defense.
Ordinarily, when a creditor, by his actions, impairs the value of collateral securing the underlying obligation guaranteed
by a guarantor, "either absolute or conditional, the guarantor will be discharged
from his obligation to the extent of the
impairment" Valley Bank & Trust Co. v.
Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 742
P.2d 105, 108-09 (Utah CtApp.1987) (citation omitted). A guarantor may, however,
expressly waive his or her right to raise the
defense of impairment of collateral. Id. at
109. See also Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d
1095, 1097 (Utah 1985); Heller v. United
States Rock Wool Co., 93 Utah Adv.Rep. 8,
9 (Utah CtApp.1988).
The provisions of the SBA guaranty
agreements, signed by each of the guarantors, expressly waive an impairment defense:
[Guarantors] . . . consent to the substitution, exchange, or release of all or any
part of the collateral—
The obligation of . . . [Guarantors] shall
not be released, discharged, or in any
way affected, nor shall the [Guarantors]
have any rights or recourse against [Capital], by reason of any action [Capital]
may take or omit to take under the foregoing powers.
This language is clear and unequivocal.
Guarantors have expressly consented to a

waiver and release of their rights in the
collateral. The Tenth Circuit, interpreting
the identical provisions of an SBA guaranty, has similarly held that this provision
amounts to a waiver by guarantors of their
right to claim impairment of collateral.
See United States v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 84&-47 (10th
Cir.1986).
We are not persuaded by guarantors'
allegations that Capital acted "willfully."
We are mindful that parties to an SBA
guaranty do not waive an impairment of
collateral defense where the acts of a lender are deemed "willful." See New Mexico
Landscaping, 785 F.2d at 847-48. In order to demonstrate the requisite "willfulness" "a guarantor must allege more than
'gross neglect of a known duty/ " Id. at
848. "A guarantor . . . must allege 'a purpose by the [Lender] to diminish the value
of the security in order to intentionaUy
injure the defendants/ " Id.
Guarantors in this action have not alleged in their original complaint such a
purpose by Capital, nor did they submit
affidavits to support such a position.
Thus, we find no error in the trial court's
order granting summary judgment on their
impairment of collateral defense.
Reckless Loss of
Security/Modification of Obligation
We further find guarantors' remaining
defenses, reckless loss of security and modification of the underlying obligation were
properly dismissed
Guarantors have
failed to demonstrate that Capital did not
maintain a perfected security interest in
the collateral at all relevant times. Furthermore, even if guarantors could identify
some technical transgression in Capital's
security interest, the language of the guaranties previously identified in this opinion
clearly constitute a waiver of said transgressions.
Finally, we reject guarantor!' contentions that they are discharged from their
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the
v by reason of the Loan Restructrial
court's summary judgment in favor of
—
_
Once again, the clear and
Capital.
unaquisoeal language of the guarantiee
empower* Capital "to modify or otherwise
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.
change any terms of all or any part" of the
agreement
(O fUYNUKM«SttUM>
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA
SEFTEL, and MICHAEL LANDES,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-86-1810

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
SIDNEY SEFTEL, et al.,
Counterclaim Defendants,

Before the Court is defendant and counterclaimant Capital
City Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The interested parties

through their counsel appeared and argued their respective positions.

Following argument, the Court took the matter under

advisement to further consider the Memoranda of Points and Authorities submitted by the parties, and to conduct further legal
research.

The Court has now had the opportunity to carefully

review and consider the arguments and legal authorities cited
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by t h e p a r t i e s , review t h e supporting attachments and affidavits
if t h e p a r t i e s
v. H

:onduct independent research on the applicable
> i I" e i < j ' i •' 11 e r w i s e 1 u 1L y

i"t

a d v i s e d , enter

I he following Memorandum Decision.
-«,,-

--:.* d e f e n d a n t
•

-

a n d counterclaimant:

capital

h a s moved for Summary Judgment

n plaintiffs' Compla

* s e e k i n g dismissal of t h e plaintiffs'

Complair^ .*? \ matter -:f law.

Capital h a s also moved for Si immary

. .sim against plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendants, including the plaintiff, the Utah State Tax Commission,
C r o s s r o a d s P l a z a A s s o c i a t e s , Y on ng E ] e < : t r I c SI q n <V" omp a ny
„/ r „-

..i Shopping Center, Ltd., seeking from t h e plaintiffs

~e a m o u n t s c l a i m e d
an

a nci

d u e on t h e i r

i n d i v i d u a l g u a r a n t e e s , and

O r d e r o f foreclosi.ii «, o n l" h e f t mst d e e d

a l i^s>iie

Kid for

a further Order declaring that the Interests of Capital are
superior to the claims, if any
def endartc'

i

»• i t :

<-* the remaining counterclaim
"omm J S S L OII , C r o s s r o a d s "Plaza

A s s o c i a t e s , Young Electric Sign Company, and Olympus Hills Shopping
Center, L t d .
Tl
briefed

- lies I'lirnl .it nuiTittiil Si I im tlliis Cii.se h a v e

been

carefully

counsel, and therefore t h e Court does n o t undertake

to review t h e authorities applicable t o t h e va:
T1 I E p3 a I nti f £ s f C o m p 1 a i n t a 1 ] eges against
first cause <

Capital

its

a c t i o n t h a t Capita] h a s breached t h e guarantee
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agreement executed by the plaintiffs in favor of Capital.

The

guarantees were made in furtherance of a note and trust deed
executed by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., (hereinafter "Bagel
Nosh") in which the plaintiffs were principals.

The guarantees

are absolute, unconditional and personal as to each plaintiff
in favor of Capital.

Bagel Nosh has filed a voluntary Chapter

XI Bankruptcy Petition.

The issues in this case are governed

by federal law in accordance with the agreements between the
parties.

Federal law is dispositive of the plaintiffs1 first

cause of action in that under applicable federal decisions from
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals the plaintiffs do not have
an actionable claim for unjustifiable impairment of collateral.
The Court is further of the opinion that even if Utah law was
applicable, no breach can be shown, all as more particularly
set forth by Capital in its Memoranda, the argument on which
the Court finds persuasive on those issues.
The plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges reckless
loss of a security interest.

The materials submitted clearly

show that Capital perfected its security interests in the collateral.

It further appears that plaintiffs' claim is again

based upon Utah law which is not applicable under the agreement
between the parties.

Under federal law, Capital has no duty

to maintain or perfect a security interest in the collateral
in that the plaintiffs/guarantors have waived that defense.
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As the record is clear that Capital has in fact protected its
security interests, even if Utah law were applicable, Capital
has complied.
Plaintiffs' third cause of action alleges that the guarantees
are of no affect, because the underlying obligation was modified.
Under the terms of the guarantees, modifications have been authorized
in advance by the plaintiffs/guarantors.

Certainly, the modifica-

tions which are in actuality more favorable to the plaintiffs/
guarantors cannot be complained of at this point by the guarantors
where they have paid under the guarantee since the default of
the principal debtor Bagel Nosh, and if not estopped at this
point, have impliedly given their consent to modification.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs/guarantors have waived the defense
regarding modification, and if they have not so waived that
defense through the guarantees, they are estopped and have otherwise
consented to the modification.
The allegations of "material issues of fact remaining"
by the plaintiffs are without merit.

The claimed factual issues

either do not actually exist, or if they do exist, they are
not material and substantial so as to require this Court to
deny Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Sweeping aside all the legalese, the plaintiffs have executed
unconditional guarantees in favor of Capital to induce a loan
to their company, Bagel Nosh.

Bagel Nosh has defaulted, and
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Capital is entitled to resort to the guarantees which the plaintiffs
originally made.
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party,
the Small Business Administration, has not been joined.
defense is without merit.

That

In the first instance, the defense

has not been pled, but additionally, the SBA is not under the
present interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an indispensable
party to this action.
As to the remaining counter defendants, Utah State Tax
Commission, Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign
Company, and the Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., to the
extent that they assert interests in the properties that Capital
seeks to foreclose, those interests are inferior to Capital's.
The Court concludes that Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment,
both as to the plaintiffs' Complaint, and as to Capital's Counterclaim should be granted, and that there are no material questions
of fact existing, and that the defendant and counerclaimant
Capital is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law.
For the purposes of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court has granted Capital's Motion on all the
bases alleged by Capital in its moving papers and supporting
documents, with the exception of the claims of laches, which
the Court determines would require a further hearing, and are
not ripe for Summary Judgment.
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Counsel for Capital is

Order in accordance

with this Memorandum Decision

with Rule 52(a)

of the Utah Rules of Civil

the bases granted,

and submit the same in accordance

Rules of Practice

for the Court's review and signatu
Dated this

i^

day of

?IHOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST
H. DIXON HJNDLEv

By

$SJJ£^U£T>*^^
Deputy Q&*
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